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I. INTRODUCTION
City State Bank v. Holstinel fundamentally changed summary
judgment law in Nebraska. The Holstine decision requires a moving
plaintiff to show no genuine issues of material fact exist on the defen-
dant's affirmative defenses.2 This change has gone seemingly unno-
ticed by many attorneys and scholars throughout the state. Despite
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Karin Elizabeth Iossi Anderson, B.A., 1999, University of Nebraska, J.D. ex-
pected, May 2003, University of Nebraska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW RE-
VIEW, Executive Editor, Spring 2002). Thank you to my husband, Kiffin
Anderson, and my parents, Tom and Margaret Iossi, for their support. Also,
thank you to Kristine Brenneis, R.J. Shortridge, and Steve Preston for their in-
sight on this Note.
1. 260 Neb. 578, 618 N.W.2d 704 (2000).
2. Id. at 584, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
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the lack of notoriety, practitioners should not overlook the dangerous
precedent the Nebraska Supreme Court has established.
This Note outlines the change Holstine had on the law and the im-
plications the decision will have on future litigation. Part II presents
an overview of summary judgment law in Nebraska and the Holstine
decision. Part III addresses Nebraska law prior to Holstine and then
analyzes the authority cited in the Holstine decision. Part III also con-
siders the policy implications of the decision and concludes with a dis-
cussion of the approaches taken by courts in other jurisdictions.
Overall, this Note demonstrates the Holstine decision will have detri-
mental effects on plaintiffs moving for summary judgment in
Nebraska.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Summary Judgment in Nebraska
A brief overview of summary judgment law in Nebraska, with spe-
cial attention focused on the burden of proof, is necessary to best un-
derstand the underlying situation presented in Holstine. The purpose
of summary judgment is to "pierce sham pleadings and dispose of
cases where there is no genuine claim or defense."
3 The general proce-
dure and requirements for a summary judgment motion are found in
the Nebraska statutes.4 Section 25-1332 provides that a summary
judgment motion should be granted when there is not a genuine issue
of material fact.5 This statute also states pleadings and other sup-
porting documents presented by the parties are used by the court to
determine if a genuine issue exists on a material fact.
6 If there is not
a genuine factual issue, the party that moved for summary judgment
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
7 Therefore, summary judg-
ment serves as a means to look beyond the allegations pled by the
3. Draemel v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 223 Neb. 645, 649, 395 N.W.2d
759, 763 (1986); accord, Gall v. Great W. Sugar Co., 219 Neb. 354, 355, 363
N.W.2d 373, 375 (1985); Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 119, 362
N.W.2d 35, 39 (1985); Cummings v. Curtiss, 219 Neb. 106, 108, 361 N.W.2d 508,
510 (1985).
4. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1330 to 1336 (Reissue 1995, Cum. Supp. 2000 & Supp.
2001).
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1332 (Reissue 1995).
6. Id.; see also Keefe v. Glasford's Enters., Inc. 248 Neb. 64, 69-70, 532 N.W.2d 626,
630 (1995) (noting summary judgment motions are granted only if"the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits" admitted to the record show
there is no issue of material fact).
7. E.g., Dvorak v. Bunge Corp., 256 Neb. 341, 348, 590 N.W.2d 682, 687 (1999);
Foreman v. AS Mid-America, Inc., 255 Neb. 323, 326, 586 N.W.2d 290, 295
(1998); Deprez v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 255 Neb. 381, 384, 584 N.W.2d 805, 807
(1998); Kozicki v. Dragon, 255 Neb. 248, 251, 583 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1998).
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parties. If a genuine issue of fact does not exist, summary judgment
ensures the significant expense and time of trial are prevented.8
Initially, the moving party has the burden to show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact.9 The movant "must produce sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law."o In order to meet this burden, a movant must
make a prima facie case for summary judgment "by producing enough
evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to a judgment if
the evidence [remains] uncontroverted at trial."11
While this initial burden is still on the movant, the nonmovant's
inaction can result in a concession to certain issues. If a nonmovant
does not disagree with or challenge a fact in a movant's affidavit, the
court assumes that particular fact is not in dispute.12 In other words,
failure of a nonmovant to contradict a particular fact is viewed by the
court as a concession. However, if an issue of fact depends on a wit-
ness' credibility, then summary judgment will not be granted and the
case must proceed to trial.13 Once the movant makes a prima facie
summary judgment case, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant. 14
The nonmovant must then show that there is a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact that makes judgment as a matter of law improper.15 If the
8. See Moore v. Am. Charter Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 219 Neb. 793, 794, 336 N.W.2d
436, 437 (1985).
9. Gitschel v. Sauer, 212 Neb. 454, 456, 323 N.W.2d 93, 95 (1982) ("The burden is
upon the party moving for summary judgment to show that no issue of fact exists,
and unless he can conclusively do so, the motion must be overruled."); accord,
Knudsen v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 257 Neb. 912, 916, 601 N.W.2d 725, 728
(1999); Kaiser v. Millard Lumber, Inc., 255 Neb. 943, 949, 587 N.W.2d 875, 880
(1999); Krohn v. Gardner, 248 Neb. 210, 212, 533 N.W.2d 95, 97 (1995).
10. Stiver v. Allsup, Inc., 255 Neb. 687, 693, 587 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1999); accord, Boyle
v. Welsh, 256 Neb. 118, 125, 589 N.W.2d 118, 124 (1999); Deprez v. Cont'l W. Ins.
Co., 255 Neb. 381, 384, 584 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1998).
11. Iwanski v. Gomes, 259 Neb. 632, 639, 611 N.W.2d 607, 612 (2000); accord,
Durkan v. Vaughan, 259 Neb. 288, 291, 609 N.W.2d 358, 361 (2000); Herman
Bros., Inc. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 255 Neb. 88, 93, 582 N.W.2d 328, 332 (1998).
12. Raskey v. Michelin Tire Corp., 223 Neb. 520, 528, 391 N.W.2d 123, 128 (1986); see
also Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 1141, 1150, 510 N.W.2d 550, 555
(1993) (holding movant "produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence presented for sum-
mary judgment remained uncontroverted").
13. See Bates v. Design of the Times, Inc., 261 Neb. 332, 336-37, 622 N.W.2d 684, 687
(2001); Medley v. Davis, 247 Neb. 611, 619, 529 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1995); Armstrong
v. Armstrong, 192 Neb. 11, 16, 218 N.W.2d 541, 544 (1974).
14. E.g., Durkan v. Vaughan, 259 Neb. 288, 291, 609 N.W.2d 358, 361 (2000); Her-
man Bros., Inc. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 255 Neb. 88, 93, 582 N.W.2d 328, 332
(1998); Healy v. Langdon, 245 Neb. 1, 4, 511 N.W.2d 498, 501 (1994); Universal
Assurors Life Ins. Co. v. Hohnstein, 243 Neb. 359, 366, 500 N.W.2d 811, 816
(1993).
15. E.g., Huff v. Swartz, 258 Neb. 820, 831, 606 N.W.2d 461, 470 (2000); Bargman v.
Soll Oil Co., 253 Neb. 1018, 1027, 574 N.W.2d 478, 485 (1998); Popple v. Rose,
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nonmovant fails to meet its burden of showing a factual issue exists,
summary judgment will be granted in the movant's favor.16
The nonmovant has an advantage throughout the process of a sum-
mary judgment motion because the court looks at the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmovant.17 Since Holstine was an ap-
peal, it is also important to note that on appeal, "a court views the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judg-
ment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable in-
ferences deducible from the evidence."' 8 Thus, the court gives the
nonmoving party a benefit not available to the moving party in deter-
mining if a genuine issue of material fact exists.
B. City State Bank v. Holstine
Holstine involved a fairly straightforward case between a bank and
a co-signer on a loan.19 City State Bank ("Bank"), located in Clay
County, Nebraska, issued a loan for over $100,000 to William B.
Gorman, for which Ronald R. Holstine cosigned a promissory note.
Less than a year after the note was signed, it fell into default by rea-
son of nonpayment. The Bank then sued Holstine in the District
Court of Clay County seeking to recover the amount of the loan and
interest. Holstine, a Colorado resident, answered with affirmative de-
fenses; he claimed, among other things, that he was fraudulently in-
duced by the Bank to cosign and that the note contained material
misrepresentations. 20 Holstine made several specific allegations in
his affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation, such as the
Bank did not tell him the purpose of the promissory note was to hold
Holstine liable for debts from Gorman's partnership.
2 1
254 Neb. 1, 3, 573 N.W.2d 765, 768 (1998); Molt v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 248 Neb. 81,
88, 532 N.W.2d 11, 16 (1995).
16. See Battle Creek State Bank v. Preusker, 253 Neb. 502, 513, 571 N.W.2d 294,
301-02 (1997).
17. See Knudsen v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 257 Neb. 912, 913, 601 N.W.2d 725, 727
(1999); Stiver v. Allsup, Inc., 255 Neb. 687, 693, 587 N.W.2d 77 (1998); Deprez v.
Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 255 Neb. 381, 384, 584 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1998).
18. Iwanski v. Gomes, 259 Neb. 632, 636, 611 N.W.2d 607, 611 (2000); accord, Her-
man Bros., Inc. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 255 Neb. 88, 90, 582 N.W.2d 328, 330
(1998); Swoboda v. Mercer Mgmt. Co., 251 Neb. 347, 348, 557 N.W.2d 629, 630
(1997).
19. 260 Neb. at 578, 618 N.W.2d at 706.
20. The other four affirmative defenses that Holstine asserted were: the note did not
have sufficient consideration, his obligation changed because the Bank did not
get the proper insurance on Gorman, the Bank did not give Holstine notice there
would not be insurance, and the Bank conspired to fraudulently induce him to
agree to cosign. Id. at 580, 618 N.W.2d at 706-07.
21. The other specific misrepresentations made by Holstine were that the Bank
schemed to set up the loan so the money would go to Gorman's partner, who
would pay the Bank and work the transaction so that the Bank's past financial
problems with Gorman would be minimized. Also, he alleged that the Bank did
2002]
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The Bank denied the allegations in the affirmative defenses and
moved for summary judgment. At the hearing there were exhibits en-
tered onto the record, 2 2 and summary judgment was granted in the
Bank's favor.23 Holstine proceeded to move for a new trial, which was
denied.24 Holstine then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
He claimed it was error to grant summary judgment in favor of the
Bank, because his affirmative defenses raised genuine issues of mate-
rial fact.
The Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the Bank did not produce
evidence on Holstine's affirmative defenses.25 The court then briefly
outlined summary judgment procedure by citing various Nebraska
cases. 26 According to the court, the "posture of the case" required the
Bank, in showing they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, to
introduce evidence showing Holstine's affirmative defenses did not
create a genuine issue of material fact.2 7 The court held, in reference
to Holstine's affirmative defenses, that the Bank "failed to meet its
burden as the party moving for summary judgment to produce evi-
dence which, if uncontroverted, would entitle it to judgment as a mat-
ter of law."28 On that basis, the court held Holstine did not have the
burden shifted to him.29 Concluding that there was a genuine issue of
fact due to the affirmative defenses raised in Holstine's answer, the
court reversed the judgment for the Bank and remanded the case. 30
III. ANALYSIS
In Holstine, the Nebraska Supreme Court changed summary judg-
ment law. The decision changed the burden of proof on plaintiffs mov-
ing for summary judgment against defendants raising affirmative
not disclose the relationship problems in Gorman's partnership, the partnership's
inability to get more money without Holstine, and that the Bank stated there
would never be a time Holstine would be liable to pay on the note. Id. at 581, 618
N.W.2d at 707.
22. The Bank offered exhibits into the record that are evidenced in the bill of excep-
tions. It was stipulated between the Bank and Holstine that Holstine mailed one
exhibit two weeks after the summary judgment hearing and three more in a time
period starting around a month after the hearing and ending almost four months
later. Id. at 581, 618 N.W.2d at 707.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 581-82, 618 N.W.2d at 707.
25. Id. at 583, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
26. Cass Const. Co. v. Brennan, 222 Neb. 69, 382 N.W.2d 313 (1986); Moore v. Am.
Charter Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 219 Neb. 793, 366 N.W.2d 436 (1985).
27. Holstine, 260 Neb. at 584, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 585, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
30. Id. at 585, 618 N.W.2d at 709-10. The court also stated "[wie conclude that the
Bank failed to show that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the
affirmative defenses pled by Holstine and that therefore, the district court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank." Id.
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defenses. In order to fully understand the Holstine decision, four
points must be considered. First, Holstine is inconsistent with several
previous cases. Second, the cases cited by the court in Holstine do not
provide a strong basis for the court's decision. Third, this decision cre-
ates policy concerns because it will increase inefficiencies in future lit-
igation and will lead to frivolous lawsuits. Finally, the approaches
other jurisdictions take with respect to this procedural situation are
important in understanding the Holstine decision.
A. Previous Nebraska Cases
Holstine fundamentally changed the standard established in previ-
ous cases wherein the plaintiff moved for summary judgment against
a defendant claiming an affirmative defense. In Holstine, the court
held the plaintiff had the initial burden to show the defendant's af-
firmative defenses did not present an issue of fact. 3 1 The cases that
addressed this type of summary judgment situation prior to Holstine
took a distinctively different approach. These cases put the initial
burden on the defendant to show the affirmative defense presented an
issue of fact.32 Three cases best illustrate how Holstine changed Ne-
braska law: Bender v. James,3 3 Farmers Cooperative Exchange v.
Demerath Land Co.,34 and Talle v. Nebraska Department of Social
Services .35
In Bender, the plaintiff brought suit to quiet title.36 The defendant
claimed ownership by adverse possession, but the plaintiff held record
ownership. The defendant appealed the district court's summary
judgment ruling in favor of the plaintiff. In affirming summary judg-
ment for the plaintiff, the Nebraska Supreme Court held:
The plaintiffs' evidence establishes undisputed record title in themselves, and
therefore a prima facie showing for summary judgment has been established.
The defendant has raised as an affirmative defense the claim of adverse pos-
session. The defendant has failed to offer competent evidence that there is a
genuine issue as to that fact .... Defendant's claim of adverse possession is
without merit.
3 7
Thus, in Bender the defendant was assigned the burden to present
issues of fact on the affirmative defense even where the plaintiff
moved for summary judgment.
In Farmers, the plaintiff sued to collect money due on a purchase.
3 8
As an affirmative defense, the defendant claimed the goods did not
31. Id. at 584-85, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
32. See cases cited infra notes 33-35.
33. 212 Neb. 77, 321 N.W.2d 436 (1982).
34. No. A-93-993, 1995 WL 382739 (Neb. Ct. App. June 27, 1995).
35. 249 Neb. 20, 541 N.W.2d 30 (1995).
36. 212 Neb. at 78, 321 N.W.2d at 438.
37. Id. at 82, 321 N.W.2d at 440 (citation omitted).
38. 1995 WL 382739.
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meet the implied warranty of merchantability. The plaintiff moved
for partial summary judgment, claiming the alleged affirmative de-
fenses did not "establish the facts that are the basis of the affirmative
defenses."39 The district court found the affirmative defense consti-
tuted a conclusion of law, as opposed to asserting facts that supported
the conclusion.40
On the defendant's appeal, the court held the plaintiff presented
"prima facie evidence" that there was no genuine issue of material
fact.41 The plaintiff only presented evidence on its claim, not on the
defendant's affirmative defense. The court stated the burden then
shifted to the defendant to dispute the plaintiffs "prima facie case."4 2
The plaintiff did not address the defendant's affirmative defense of
implied warranty of merchantability. Thus, Farmers clearly placed
the burden on the defendant to present issues of fact on an affirmative
defense when the plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
In Talle, the plaintiff sued for negligence, and the defendant
claimed assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense.43 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.44 The court noted a defendant carries the burden of estab-
lishing the elements before questions of fact on assumption of the risk
can go to a jury.45 While the opinion did not specify which party
presented the evidence, the court held the affirmative defense could
not be submitted to the jury as a question of fact.46 The defendant did
not meet its burden of showing the plaintiff understood there was a
danger, an element of assumption of the risk.47 In other words, the
court held the defendant did not meet its burden because it failed to
show the affirmative defense as pled raised an issue of fact.48
In all three cases, the plaintiffs, like the Bank in Holstine, moved
for summary judgment against a defendant asserting an affirmative
defense. In the cases prior to Holstine, the defendants were assigned
the burden to present evidence showing issues of fact existed on the
affirmative defenses. The plaintiffs only had to present evidence on
their own claims in order to obtain summary judgment. Then, after
39. Id. at *2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *5.
42. Id.
43. 249 Neb. at 22-24, 541 N.W.2d at 32-33.
44. Id. at 25, 541 N.W.2d at 34.
45. Id. at 23-24, 541 N.W.2d at 33-34.
46. Id. at 25, 541 N.W.2d at 34.
47. Id. While the majority affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff, the dissent
felt the majority decided a question of fact, rather than deciding the existence of a
question of fact. Id. at 27, 541 N.W.2d at 35 (Caporale, J., dissenting in part).
48. See also AnderzhonlArchitects, Inc. v. 57 Oxbow II P'ship, 250 Neb. 768, 553
N.W.2d 157 (1996) (involving plaintiff who disproved defendant's affirmative de-
fenses by proving her own prima facie case for summary judgment).
[Vol. 81:424
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the plaintiffs produced prima facie evidence on their own claims, the
defendants were obligated to show their affirmative defenses created
an issue of fact. Holstine directly contradicts these cases. The Bank
in Holstine was denied summary judgment because it failed to pro-
duce evidence showing Holstine's affirmative defenses did not raise an
issue of fact.4 9 Therefore, the Holstine decision implicitly overruled
these cases and declared a new standard for summary judgment in
Nebraska.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Holstine created incon-
sistent case law by failing to overrule contradictory cases like those
discussed above. This error by the court will cause problems in the
future because both parties in a summary judgment motion will be
able to cite authority in their favor. Plaintiffs can cite cases like
Bender, Farmers, and Talle to show the defendant has the burden to
present issues of fact on an affirmative defense. Defendants need only
look to Holstine to argue the plaintiff is charged with this burden. In-
deed, the Holstine decision left uncertainty that will impact attorneys
and courts throughout Nebraska.
B. The Authority in the Decision
The authority relied upon throughout the court's analysis in Hol-
stine is inadequate to support shifting the burden of producing evi-
dence on the defendant's affirmative defenses to a plaintiff moving for
summary judgment. There are two flaws in the analysis of the deci-
sion. First, the bulk of the court's analysis involved parties in a differ-
ent procedural position than the parties in Holstine. Second, the court
misconstrued three cases it relied on in its analysis. In addition, the
briefs of the parties illustrate how the court's interpretation of prior
Nebraska law was surprising and unanticipated.
First, the court's analysis in Holstine relied on cases involving a
different procedural posture. In Nebraska, most cases involving af-
firmative defenses and summary judgment make their way to the Ne-
braska Court of Appeals and the Nebraska Supreme Court when the
defendant, rather than the plaintiff, is the party moving for summary
judgment.50 Defendants who raise an affirmative defense and move
for summary judgment do not have to offer evidence on elements of
the plaintiffs claim.5 1 If the defendant presents evidence showing
49. 260 Neb. at 584-85, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
50. See, e.g., Morrison Enter. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 Neb. 634, 619 N.W.2d 432
(2000) (involving defendant who asserted affirmative defenses and went on to
move for summary judgment); Keefe v. Glasford's Enter., Inc., 248 Neb. 64, 532
N.W.2d 626 (1995) (involving defendant who moved for summary judgment after
asserting affirmative defenses in answer).
51. See Vergara v. Lopez-Vasque, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 1141, 510 N.W.2d 550 (1993).
2002]
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there is no issue of fact on the affirmative defense, the defendant has
met its burden.52
In many of the cases the court relied on in Holstine, the defendant
was the party moving for summary judgment. Of the four cases the
court cited in its analysis, only one involved a plaintiff moving for
summary judgment. 53 Further, the only case with a moving plaintiff
was cited as authority for the notion that issues are framed by the
pleadings.54 It was not cited as authority for the Bank's responsibility
to produce evidence refuting Holstine's affirmative defenses. 5
5
Second, the analysis in the Holstine decision misconstrued three
cases. First, the court in Holstine relied on Cass Construction Co. v.
Brennan.56 The court, citing Brennan, held that in order to have the
burden shifted to Holstine, the Bank was required to produce evidence
on Holstine's affirmative defenses to the extent sufficient to show
there was no genuine issue of material fact.57 However, Brennan
stated that the movant "may discharge" this burden by showing the
nonmovant could not produce evidence contradicting the movant's po-
sition.58 Brennan does not state that this is the only or required way
to discharge the burden.59 Thus, Brennan is not sufficient authority
to unconditionally require a plaintiff moving for summary judgment to
essentially disprove the alleged affirmative defenses.
The court also relied on Moore v. American Charter Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n. 60 In Moore, the defendants, after making specific
denials without raising an affirmative defense, moved for summary
judgment.61 The court in Moore considered only the pleadings, along
with some documents the plaintiff had attached to her pleadings, in
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.62 Throughout
the analysis in Moore, the court did not address affirmative defenses.
The Moore decision did note that the moving "party must ... produce
enough evidence to demonstrate his entitlement to a judgment if the
52. See id. at 1150, 510 N.W.2d at 555.
53. Sherrets, Smith & Gardner v. MJ Optical, Inc., 259 Neb. 424, 610 N.W.2d 413
(2000) (plaintiffs moved for summary judgment); Neb. Popcorn, Inc. v. Wing, 258
Neb. 60, 602 N.W.2d 18 (1999) (defendant moved for summary judgment); Cass
Constr. Co. v. Brennan, 222 Neb. 69, 382 N.W.2d 313 (1986) (defendant moved for
summary judgment); Moore v. Am. Charter Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 219 Neb.
793, 366 N.W.2d 436 (1985) (defendants moved for summary judgment).
54. City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 578, 584, 618 N.W.2d 704, 709 (2000).
55. Id.
56. 222 Neb. 69, 382 N.W.2d 313 (1986).
57. Holstine, 260 Neb. at 584, 618 N.W.2d at 709 (citing Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennan,
222 Neb. 69, 382 N.W.2d 313(1986)).
58. 222 Neb. at 82, 382 N.W.2d at 322.
59. Id.
60. 219 Neb. 793, 366 N.W.2d 436 (1985).
61. Id. at 796, 366 N.W.2d at 438.
62. Id. at 796-97, 366 N.W.2d at 438-39.
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evidence remains uncontroverted, after which the burden of producing
contrary evidence shifts to the party opposing the motion."63 Given
the holding in Moore, a case in which the evidence was essentially lim-
ited to the pleadings and there were no affirmative defenses, it is diffi-
cult to determine how the court construed it to require the Bank in
Holstine to produce evidence on Holstine's affirmative defenses.
Finally, the court in Holstine relied on Nebraska Popcorn, Inc. v.
Wing.64 In Nebraska Popcorn, the defendant asserted the statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense. The defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment, presenting evidence that showed the statute of limita-
tions had run.65 After this evidence was presented, the court held the
burden shifted to the plaintiff.66 The plaintiff then had to produce
evidence that a genuine issue of fact existed and summary judgment
should not have been granted.67 Nebraska Popcorn did not deal with
the boundaries of a moving plaintiffs burden of proof when a defen-
dant asserts an affirmative defense. Thus, it does not provide suffi-
cient precedent for placing the burden on the Bank in Holstine to
produce evidence on the factual allegations in Holstine's affirmative
defenses.
Cass, Moore, and Nebraska Popcorn do not provide precedent for
the assertion that a plaintiff moving for summary judgment has to
produce evidence on the defendant's affirmative defenses. Yet, the
court in Holstine cited these cases as authority for requiring the Bank
to show Holstine's affirmative defenses did not create an issue of fact.
Thus, the cases the court referred to throughout the analysis in the
Holstine opinion were erroneously used to establish the standard of
placing the burden on the plaintiff.
In addition, the briefs indicate neither party anticipated the court's
interpretation of these prior cases. The briefs presented by both par-
ties support the notion that neither party knew of Nebraska case law
holding the plaintiff responsible for producing evidence on the defen-
dant's affirmative defenses. In Holstine's brief, he argued summary
judgment in favor of the Bank should be reversed because the Bank
did not present evidence on his affirmative defenses. 68 Yet, Holstine
did not provide any authority for the Bank having this burden of
proof.
6 9
63. Id. at 794, 366 N.W.2d at 437.
64. 258 Neb. 60, 602 N.W.2d 18 (1999).
65. Id. at 69, 602 N.W.2d at 25.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Brief for Appellant at 3, City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 69, 618 N.W.2d
704 (2000) (No. A99-0855) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
69. See id. at 3-4.
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Holstine's brief7O cited AMISUB v. Allied Property,71 which held
"the only affirmative defenses that can prevent such a summary judg-
ment are those which are pled by the defendant."7 2 AMISUB focused
on the fact that defendants cannot use affirmative defenses to pre-
clude summary judgment on a plaintiffs motion if the affirmative de-
fenses were not raised in the pleadings. The case did not focus on the
plaintiffs burden to disprove affirmative defenses. Thus, Holstine
misconstrued this case and applied it out of context. Holstine pled his
affirmative defenses, and since AMISUB did not hold that pleading
affirmative defenses automatically precludes summary judgment, it is
irrelevant.73
On the other hand, the Bank's brief made the straightforward as-
sertion that defendants have the burden of proving affirmative de-
fenses.74 The Bank also noted that Holstine did not produce evidence
on his affirmative defenses at the hearing. 75 While the court is not
limited to the case law presented in the party briefs, neither brief ref-
erenced any solid authority for the Bank having this burden. Even
though the cases, as construed by the court, turned out to be very ben-
eficial to Holstine, none were cited in his brief.76 Thus, it appears that
the parties themselves were taken by surprise at the court's interpre-
tation of Moore, Cass, and Nebraska Popcorn.77
C. Policy Implications
While the lack of Nebraska authority for the Holstine decision is
disconcerting, it is not nearly as troublesome as the policy implica-
tions of the decision. The policy concerns fall into two general catego-
ries. First, the decision will create great inefficiencies in future
litigation. Second, there will be an increase in wasteful and frivolous
litigation. Together, these policy implications demonstrate the court
erred by holding a moving plaintiff has the burden to show there are
no issues of material fact on a defendant's affirmative defenses.
First, this decision will lead to great inefficiencies in litigation. It
puts plaintiffs in a position where they are obligated to show issues of
fact do not exist on affirmative defenses. In order to accomplish this,
plaintiffs will have to present more deposition testimony and affida-
70. Id. at 5.
71. 6 Neb. Ct. App. 696, 576 N.W.2d 493 (1998).
72. Id. at 710, 576 N.W.2d at 503 (holding failure to plead an affirmative defense is a
waiver of that defense).
73. The Holstine court recognized this by not addressing it in the opinion.
74. Brief for Appellee at 22-23, City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 69, 618 N.W.2d
704 (2000) (No. A99-0855) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
75. Id. at 23.
76. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 68, at ii. These three cases were not cited in the
Bank's brief either. See Appellee's Brief, supra note 74, at iii-iv.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 53-67.
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vits than they do when they only have to prove there is no genuine
issue of material fact on their own claims. Thus, when a plaintiff be-
lieves there is no genuine issue of fact and wishes to move for sum-
mary judgment, the burden established in Holstine requires the
plaintiff to spend significantly more time and money investigating the
defendant's alleged affirmative defenses. The plaintiff will have to
collect depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits not only on
its own claim, but also on the opposing party's claim. Since the pur-
pose of summary judgment is to avoid the cost and time of a trial when
a claim is insufficient, it is counterproductive to put this burden, re-
quiring more time and expense, on the plaintiff.
78
Since the plaintiff is not the party asserting the affirmative de-
fense, the plaintiff will rarely be well situated to know exactly who
and what to seek out while it is collecting evidence for the record. On
the other hand, the defendant, as the party asserting the defense, is
always well situated to know exactly who can attest that an issue ex-
ists on that defense. Defendants assert affirmative defenses after
carefully considering ways to prove them at trial and after developing
a logical reasoning for their foundation. Plaintiffs will have to spend
considerable time trying to calculate how defendants plan to prove
their defenses and uncovering the reasoning behind those defenses.
The courts have long recognized these inefficiencies by placing the
burden of proof on defendants to prove their affirmative defenses at
trial.79 Simply put, it is unfair to put this burden on the plaintiff dur-
ing summary judgment when the plaintiff would not have this burden
of proof at trial.
8 0
In addition, the very nature of what Holstine requires of a moving
plaintiff will take a significant amount of time, if it is even possible.8 1
Essentially, the plaintiff will have to prove a negative. Holstine's af-
firmative defense of fraud is a good illustration of the difficulty this
standard presents. A plaintiff moving for summary judgment against
a defendant who raises fraud as an affirmative defense will have to
show there was no fraud. It would take considerably less time and
resources for the defendant to present an affidavit or deposition
78. See generally Thomas Kallay, Managing the Burdens Imposed on Motions for
Summary Judgment in California: The 1992 and 1993 Amendments to CCP
437C, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39 (2000) (noting how summary judgment saves
the time and money of trial on insufficient claims).
79. See, e.g., Porter v. Smith, 240 Neb. 928, 938, 486 N.W.2d 846, 853 (1992); Roan
Eagle v. State, 237 Neb. 961, 968, 468 N.W.2d 382, 387-88 (1991); Georgetowne
Ltd. P'ship v. Geotechnical Servs., Inc., 230 Neb. 22, 25, 430 N.W.2d 34, 37
(1988).
80. Kallay, supra note 78, at 59.
81. Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judg-
ment and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 455, 498 (1997)
(stating that the "burden to negate an essential element of [nonmovant's] case [is]
too difficult to meet in most situations").
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enumerating exactly what was fraudulent. The defendant is most fa-
miliar with the evidence supporting the affirmative defense and could
present it more efficiently.
From the plaintiffs perspective, it is very difficult to anticipate
what cards the defense is holding, and then present evidence that
those cards do not in fact exist. It is established among attorneys that
movants will not succeed in a motion for summary judgment if they
are required to negate part of the nonmovant's claim.8 2 This standard
is too difficult for a movant to reach.8 3 Overall, scholars and legisla-
tors have recognized that it is unfavorable to the concept of summary
judgment to require a moving plaintiff to show that the nonmoving
defendant does not have evidence supporting its defense.8 4
In addition to the needless time and money this burden will cost
plaintiffs, it will cost the courts valuable judicial resources. The plain-
tiff will have to spend time taking and piecing together numerous dep-
ositions in order to show there are no issues for trial on the affirmative
defenses. This will create an excessive amount of documents for the
court to examine in determining if summary judgment should be
granted. While this is being done, the defendant could have presented
the same evidence both more efficiently and concisely. Since the de-
fendant knows exactly what evidence supports its alleged affirmative
defense, the defendant could clearly present it to the court. In addi-
tion to being clearer, the documentation presented to the court would
be condensed. Nevertheless, the time of the judges in Nebraska will
be needlessly wasted as a result of the Holstine decision. Overall, it is
an inefficient process, which goes against the norm that "procedural
rules should provide just results efficiently and economically."8 5
The second category of policy implications deals with the increase
in frivolous litigation and the potential elimination of summary judg-
ment. The standard set forth in Holstine puts defendants in a position
where they can assert affirmative defenses to preclude a plaintiffs
summary judgment motion. Essentially, a defendant can plead an af-
firmative defense to create an issue of fact that the plaintiff is not
capable of disproving. Thus, the plaintiff could not successfully move
for summary judgment because the issue of fact presented by the af-
firmative defense is one the plaintiff cannot show does not exist. In
essence, a good defense becomes a great offense for defendants.
Raising numerous affirmative defenses, such as laches, estoppel,
waiver, and equitable tolling, is not difficult for a defendant to do in its
answer. Under the standard set in Holstine, defendants who raise as
many of these affirmative defenses as possible will likely avoid having
82. Koppel, supra note 81, at 498.
83. Id.
84. Kallay, supra note 78, at 57.
85. Koppel, supra note 81, at 489.
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summary judgment entered against them. Plaintiffs moving for sum-
mary judgment will have the virtually impossible task of showing no
genuine issue of material fact exists on each of the affirmative de-
fenses raised by the defendant. Thus, the Holstine decision set a stan-
dard that defense attorneys can use to avoid having summary
judgment entered against their clients by simply raising numerous af-
firmative defenses.
The purpose of summary judgment is to pierce sham pleadings,
8 6
but the Holstine rule seems to encourage the very behavior summary
judgment is meant to avoid. Ethical implications and sanctions aside,
Holstine provides some very tempting options. Defense attorneys with
sympathetic clients can use the Holstine decision as a means of ensur-
ing plaintiffs will not be granted summary judgment and their clients
will get in front of a jury. Defense attorneys will be able to look to
Holstine, a defendant who merely pled an affirmative defense without
presenting any evidence on it, as a model for avoiding a plaintiffs mo-
tion for summary judgment. Therefore, from a policy perspective, this
decision carries with it some grave concerns for litigators in Nebraska.
D. Other Jurisdictions
The approaches other jurisdictions have taken with this type of
procedural situation provide further insight into the Holstine decision.
In order to understand how Nebraska fits into the larger trend, three
points should be considered. First, the approach taken by the federal
courts is crucial since Nebraska summary judgment law is based on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
8 7 Second, the approach of the
states within the Eighth Circuit provides a backdrop for how Ne-
braska compares with other states. Finally, the approach taken by
the Texas courts provides the ideal way to deal with this type of proce-
dural situation.
First, the approach taken by the federal courts is important in
evaluating Holstine. Nebraska summary judgment law is based on
federal summary judgment law, specifically Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56.88 Nebraska courts have looked to interpretations of Rule
56 for guidance in interpreting Nebraska summary judgment law.
8 9
Thus, the interpretation of Rule 56 by federal courts is relevant to un-
derstanding summary judgment in Nebraska.
The United States Supreme Court clarified many issues on the
burden of proof in Rule 56 summary judgment motions in Celotex
86. See supra text accompanying note 3.
87. Illian v. McManaman, 156 Neb. 12, 17, 54 N.W.2d 244, 248 (1952).
88. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
89. See, e.g., Dennis v. Berens, 156 Neb. 41, 43, 54 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1952).
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Corp. v. Catrett.90 In Celotex, the Court made two important state-
ments regarding the movant's burden of proof.9 1 First, the Court held
Rule 56 does not require "the moving party [to] support its motion
with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's
claim."9 2 While a movant can present evidence that would negate a
nonmovant's defense, it is not required. 93 This is completely the oppo-
site of what the court in Holstine required. In Holstine, the court de-
nied the Bank summary judgment for failing to show Holstine's
affirmative defenses did not raise an issue of fact.94 Essentially, what
the court was asking of the Bank would require negating Holstine's
affirmative defenses. Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court set a stan-
dard in opposition with the United States Supreme Court.
Second, the Court in Celotex held the moving party did not have a
burden "to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact . . .with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving
party bears the burden of proof."95 The Court went on to state the
moving party can simply point out "that there is an absence of evi-
dence to support the nonmoving party's case."9 6 In other words, the
movant is not required to produce evidence on issues the nonmovant
carries the burden of proof on at trial. For the purpose of the sum-
mary judgment motion, the movant just has to tell the court there is
no evidence on those issues in order to shift the burden.
Again, this is opposite of the court's holding in Holstine. A defen-
dant bears the burden of proof at trial on affirmative defenses.97 The
court in Holstine denied the Bank summary judgment because of the
Bank's failure to produce evidence on the affirmative defenses.98 This
is exactly what the Court in Celotex said is not required of the movant.
Because the court in Holstine was so adamant in their stance requir-
ing the Bank to produce this evidence even though the Bank specifi-
90. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Celotex was decided the same year as two other important
United States Supreme Court cases addressing Rule 56 issues: Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Although the three cases are usually
cited together when Rule 56 discussions emerge, only Celotex is relevant to the
discussion at hand.
91. While the movant in Celotex was a defendant, this discussion of the case shows
the propositions of law given by the Court are broad enough to apply to a case like
Holstine.
92. 477 U.S. at 323.
93. 11 JAMES WM MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[1] (3d ed. 1997)
(stating that "[i]f the movant has information which would negate an essential
element of the nonmovant's case or would nullify a defense, this can be included
in a summary judgment motion" but it is not required).
94. 260 Neb. at 584-85, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
95. 477 U.S. at 325.
96. Id.
97. See cases cited supra note 79.
98. 260 Neb. at 584-85, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
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cally denied the affirmative defenses, it is unlikely the court would
have been satisfied with the Bank merely pointing out there was no
evidence on the affirmative defenses. Therefore, the court in Holstine
went against the widely recognized standard set forth in Celotex.
9 9
Second, the way other states deal with this issue provides a com-
parison for how Holstine fits into the larger trend. States within the
Eighth Circuit provide a good backdrop for this comparison because
they show the diversity in positions taken on this issue. These posi-
tions fall into three general categories. First, there are states that
take a position inconsistent with Holstine, following a standard simi-
lar to that established by the United States Supreme Court in Celo-
tex.1 00 Second, there are states that do not have clearly developed law
in this area.10 1 Third, there are states that take the same approach as
that taken by the court in Holstine.
1 02
The first category includes states that do not follow the standard
set in Holstine. In Minnesota and Arkansas, the moving plaintiff does
not have the burden to present evidence on affirmative defenses. Min-
nesota case law implies that when a plaintiff moves for summary judg-
ment, the defendant then has to present evidence on the affirmative
defenses.1 0 3 Under Arkansas case law, when a plaintiff moves for
summary judgment, a defendant with an affirmative defense responds
by producing evidence on the affirmative defense.
1 04 The standard set
in Minnesota and Arkansas is distinguishable from that set in Hol-
stine. Minnesota and Arkansas require the nonmoving defendant to
present evidence on the affirmative defenses, while Holstine puts this
burden on the plaintiff.
10 5
The second category includes states that have undeveloped law in
this area. Both South Dakota and Iowa do not have a clear standard
for a plaintiff moving for summary judgment against a defendant with
an affirmative defense. South Dakota law is mostly limited to cases
where defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of af-
firmative defenses. 1 06 The South Dakota case law that does involve a
99. See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2727
(3d ed. 1998) (discussing the impact of Celotex); see also MOORE, supra note 93,
§ 56.13[1] (discussing the movant's burden of proof in Rule 56 summary judg-
ment motions).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 106-11.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 112-15.
103. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. Accident and Cas. Ins. of Winterthur, 525 N.W.2d
600, 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); see also Stubblefield v. Gruenberg, 426 N.W.2d
912 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (involving plaintiff who moved for summary judgment
against a defendant with an affirmative defense).
104. See Cavaliere v. Skelton, 40 S.W.3d 844, 848-49 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
105. Holstine, 260 Neb. at 584-85, 618 N.W.2d at 709.
106. See Ray v. Downes, 576 N.W.2d 896 (S.D. 1998); Cody v. Leapley, 476 N.W.2d 257
(S.D. 1991); Barger v. Cox, 372 N.W.2d 161 (S.D. 1985).
2002]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
moving plaintiff does not address the burden of proof on the affirma-
tive defenses.107 Iowa law is also not clearly developed on this issue.
In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dubuque Communica-
tions,108 the plaintiffs documents supporting its summary judgment
motion stated a belief the defenses were nonexistent. While this is
consistent with the standard the United States Supreme Court later
set in Celotex,109 the court in Dubuque did not specify this as a re-
quirement.11o Thus, Dubuque does not make a clear declaration of the
standard in Iowa.111 Overall, the law on this issue in South Dakota
and Iowa is uncertain.
The third category includes states that follow a standard like the
one set in Holstine. Both Missouri and North Dakota fall into this
category. Missouri has taken a clear position:
[Wihere the non-movant has raised an affirmative defense, as in the present
case, the movant's right to summary judgment on his or her claim depends
just as much on the nonviability of the non-movant's affirmative defense as it
does on the viability of the movant's claim.... It does not matter that the non-
movant will bear the burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense at
trial.
11 2
In Missouri, a plaintiff has the burden to establish the affirmative de-
fense does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.113 In other
words, the plaintiff must negate the defendant's affirmative defenses
in order to succeed in a summary judgment motion.
In North Dakota, a plaintiff will not succeed on a motion for sum-
mary judgment if it does not address the defendant's affirmative de-
fenses.114 The moving plaintiff does not meet its burden unless it
clearly shows an issue of fact does not exist on the affirmative de-
fenses.115 Thus, Missouri and North Dakota put the burden on the
moving plaintiff to show the affirmative defenses do not create an is-
107. See Brown County Coop. Assoc. v. Rasmussen-King Cattle Corp., Inc., 300
N.W.2d 265, 270 (S.D. 1980) (regarding the requirement that affirmative de-
fenses be factually delineated).
108. 231 N.W.2d 12, 13 (Iowa 1975).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 90-99. The Celotex decision came over ten
years after Dubuque.
110. Dubuque, 231 N.W.2d at 13-14.
111. There are additional cases exemplifying the uncertainty of Iowa law in this area.
See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne, 424 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1988) (in-
volving affirmative defenses that did not affect the summary judgment motion);
Davis v. Comito, 204 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1973) (involving defendant who testified
in support of affirmative defenses but was not specified as having the burden of
proof); Heishman v. Heishman, 367 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (involving
decision that did not clearly specify which party had the burden of proof on af-
firmative defenses).
112. Rodgers v. Threlkeld, 22 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 710.
114. Pioneer State Bank v. Johnsrud, 284 N.W.2d 292, 298 (N.D. 1979).
115. Id. at 298.
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sue of fact. Since Holstine denied the plaintiff summary judgment for
failure to present evidence on the affirmative defenses, it is consistent
with the standard in Missouri and North Dakota.
Overall, there is great diversity among the states on this procedu-
ral issue. The states within the Eighth Circuit exemplify the different
approaches states have taken. While Holstine is consistent with some
states, it is inconsistent with others. In all, the standard in Minnesota
and Arkansas, coupled with the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Celotex, shows the Nebraska Supreme Court had a favorable
and widely accepted alternative to their decision in Holstine.
Finally, the approach of the Texas courts provides the most effi-
cient way to deal with this procedural situation. The benefits of the
Texas standard, such as quick disposal of sham pleadings, parallel the
problems created by the Holstine decision.
1 16 In Texas, when plain-
tiffs move for summary judgment against defendants who have raised
affirmative defenses, the plaintiff does not have to produce evidence
on the affirmative defenses. 11
7 This standard is best expressed in the
court's own words:
Where the plaintiff moves for summary judgment in an action in which the
defendant has pleaded an affirmative defense, he is entitled to have his sum-
mary judgment if he demonstrates by evidence that there is no material fac-
tual issue upon the elements of his claim, unless his opponent comes forward
with a showing that there is such a disputed fact issue upon the affirmative
defense.
1 1 8
The standard set forth in Texas puts the burden of showing the
existence of issues of fact on the defendant, who is the party asserting
and most familiar with the logic behind their own affirmative de-
fenses.' 19 Defendants have to clearly and quickly assert what issues
of fact exist due to their affirmative defenses or summary judgment
will be granted against them, assuming plaintiffs have met their bur-
den. Sham pleadings by defendants will be quickly disposed of, if not
completely avoided. This is because defendants clearly have the bur-
den of producing evidence on their affirmative defenses during sum-
mary judgment motions, which usually take place early in the
litigation. Thus, it effectuates the purpose of summary judgment by
quickly and efficiently disposing of sham pleadings and unnecessary
litigation. As noted earlier, some of the policy problems created by
Holstine are inefficient litigation and frivolous lawsuits.'
20 The very
116. See supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
117. See, e.g., Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974); Taylor v. Fred Clark Felt
Co., 567 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
118. Seale, 505 S.W.2d at 254 (quoting Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. McBride, 322
S.W.2d 492, 500 (Tex. 1959)).
119. See Rucker v. Bank One Tex., 36 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App. 2000) for a recent Texas
case addressing this issue.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
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benefits of the Texas standard avoid these problems. Thus, Texas has
the most efficient standard.
In all, the approaches taken by the federal courts, other states in
the Eighth Circuit, and Texas reveal the decision in Holstine was not
completely without precedent. At the same time, it breaks from the
federal standard clearly defined by the United States Supreme Court.
Also, the approach taken by some jurisdictions is more logical and effi-
cient than the standard set in Holstine. Even though there is some
precedent in other jurisdictions for the Holstine decision, the decision
is still not justified. The weight of the precedent and the relationship
between Nebraska and federal summary judgment law favor a holding
opposite of that rendered in Holstine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Holstine changed Nebraska summary judgment law by giving mov-
ing plaintiffs the burden to disprove defendants' affirmative defenses.
Holstine should have been decided differently for many reasons. The
decision contradicted prior case law and misconstrued cases through-
out the analysis. Holstine will also lead to frivolous litigation and
great inefficiencies. In addition, other jurisdictions provide favorable
alternatives to the standard set in Holstine.
Holstine provides a warning to Nebraska attorneys that the court
has engaged in an unprecedented change in the law. Making asser-
tions of law that are not founded on previous Nebraska law, yet not
overruling conflicting cases, results in an inconsistency that renders
the court's reasoning quite questionable. It raises an inference that
the court is making its decisions based on feelings towards the parties,
rather than the authority of Nebraska law.
Karin Elizabeth Iossi Anderson
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